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Historically, worker movements have played a crucial role in making workplaces
safer. Firms traditionally oppose better health standards. According to our in-
terpretation, workplace safety is costly for ￿rms but increases average health of
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risks associated with jobs. Safety standards set by better-informed trade unions
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1 Introduction
The process of economic development and growth is a process of an endless introduction of
new technologies. This is especially true for the early times of the Industrial Revolution but
also for today. When new technologies are introduced, their properties are not always well
understood. While a technology might promise a very e¢ cient provision of a certain good,
the same technology could also have side-e⁄ects the inventor did not think of. The history of
the introduction of new technologies is full of countless examples.
Coal was used as a source of energy at least since the Roman Empire. Systematic coal
mining, however, was not undertaken until the Industrial Revolution required a massive and
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version circulated as Donado and W￿lde (2008).steady supply of energy. Coal seemed the perfect solution. Mining, however, has its side
e⁄ects. In 1831 a potential causal link between working in a coal mine and the black lung
disease was ￿rst reported by a Scottish physician. Nowadays, black lung disease is accepted
as a disease caused by repeated and year-long inhalation of small amounts of coal dust. It
took more than 130 years, however, until this link was generally accepted. Only in the
1960s, after extensive political activities of various worker groups in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
West Virginia on the Appalachian coal ￿elds, the black lung disease was recognized as an
occupational disease. As a consequence, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was passed
in 1969 implying more comprehensive rules on work conditions and also compensation of
disabled mine workers (Smith, 1987).
There is an abundance of further examples of worker movements improving health and
safety conditions, including the ￿brown lung￿ disease caused by exposure to cotton dust
(Botsch, 1993), the ￿white lung￿disease caused inter alia by mining and the exposure to
asbestos (Rosner and Markovitz, 1991), the health risk caused by radium (Clark, 1997),
workplace exposure to dibromochloropropane, a pesticide that makes workers sterile and is
linked to the risk of cancer (Robinson, 1991), the spray machine con￿ ict in the early 1900s
(Frounfelker, 2006) or con￿ icts in the pottery industry (Stern, 2003) and in the automobile
and the steel industries (Bacow, 1980, ch. 5). For an overview of the literature on the history
of occupational health and safety (OHS), see Judkins (1986, p. 240). The history of labor
standards more generally with international comparisons is covered by Engerman (2003).
A reading of these analyses reveals that side-e⁄ects of new ways of production only gradu-
ally become known. While there might be uncertainty about health implications of a certain
job, there is initially often simply ignorance about health implications, sometimes just absence
of any doubt. When workers then start sensing that ￿something goes wrong￿ , that work con-
ditions cause health problems, these claims are often met with doubt, not only by employers,
but also by insurance companies or even the government. These analyses also make clear
that worker movements, joint collective actions of individuals, are required to raise political
awareness, to lobby for changes in work conditions and to eventually have regulatory changes
towards more OHS measures implemented.
Similar conclusions about the importance of worker movements to spark o⁄ broader sup-
port not only for improved working conditions but also for the development of the modern
welfare state can be drawn by looking at Germany. During the Industrial Revolution around
1850, the issues of poverty, working and life conditions of dependent workers provoked the
creation of organizations allowing the joint expression of the workers￿interests (see e.g. Schnei-
der, 2005, p. 15). While poverty and dependent work also existed in pre-industrial times, the
contemporaneous rise of wealthiness of some and poverty of others was no longer accepted
as ￿the will of God￿ . The ￿rst trade union in Germany, founded in June 1848 by type set-
ters, had as objective to secure the living standards of type setters fearing competition from
the steam engine and technological progress (hence, there was income orientation) but also
to build up mutual health and invalidity insurance systems (Schneider, 2005, p. 27). The
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tional injuries which almost caused ￿mass-causalities￿(Tennstedt et al. 1993, p. XXI), partly
due to the widespread use of new technologies and fast economic growth. These movements
and associated political pressure caused Bismarck, the German chancellor, to put - inter alia
- statutory accident insurance in force in 1884.
The upshot of this discussion about historical episodes of advanced OECD countries is
threefold: (i) A safe workplace, OHS in short, does not come for free: Achievements of the
modern welfare state which are taken for granted today were hotly disputed in the past. (ii)
There is a con￿ ict of interest between unions and ￿rms - which goes beyond pure wage bill
issues. In many cases, industry, insurance companies and often also the government initially
object to any demands for compensation or changes in health standards simply because there
is no clear scienti￿c medical evidence for the claimed nexus between certain symptoms and
the professional activity. (iii) Unions2 played a crucial role in pushing for OHS standards
and prepared and fought for what is (almost generally) accepted today as a positive aspect
of modern welfare states (see e.g. Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1), Agell (1999, p. F144)
and the discussion following below). Only once workers succeed in forming large groups and
in lobbying for their joint interests, there is enough political visibility such that changes in
OHS regulations take place. To put it short, in the spirit of Freeman and Medo⁄￿ s (1984)
￿collective voice￿ : Trade unions have a ￿good face￿as well.
The purpose of this paper is to understand why it took worker movements (rather than
the government or employers) to start the development of insurance mechanisms. Why did
worker movements eventually lead to the creation of government agencies which nowadays
regulate OHS and what are the determinants of endogenous OHS standards?
We construct a model which highlights the key ingredients for understanding the impor-
tance of worker movements in the past. Jobs have two e⁄ects on workers - they provide
income and they a⁄ect health. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will
assume that workers are entirely ignorant about the health implications of jobs - job choice
is purely based on the wage paid by the employer. Returning to the coal miner example from
above, workers were simply not aware of the potential risk of the black lung disease.3 We
consider an economy with one homogenous good and assume perfect competition on goods
and labour markets implying inter alia full employment. Unions do not cause unemployment
in our setup. Given the absence of any information on health risk of working, the production
process exerts a negative externality on workers￿health. OHS standards can in principle re-
duce this negative externality but they also reduce total factor productivity (TFP) of ￿rms,
2We will often use ￿ union￿as short-cut for more informal worker groups, worker movements or worker
associations. Union, as used here, does not necessarily describe a well-organized and at times bureaucratic
huge institution as nowadays in some OECD countries.
3We see this complete ignorance as a short-cut to a Bayesian learning setup where workers have a prior
about health implications and it takes time to learn the true health consequences of a job. See Viscusi (1979,
1980) for various applications of Bayesian learning to uncertainty about health implications of jobs.
3capturing the fact that OHS is costly. As long as health e⁄ects of working are disputed, no
employer or government would concede better working conditions.
The role of worker movements is to provide and con￿rm information about health e⁄ects
of working. An individual worker does not have enough time and makes too few observations
to discern job-related health e⁄ects from other health e⁄ects. A group of workers, a union,
has many members and thereby more observations. Learning is much faster and unions can
thereby help internalize the externality.
In standard trade union models, the objective of trade unions is to maximize the wage
income of their members. We extend this arguably narrow perspective and portray trade
unions as targeting both for high wage income and good health standards. We then ￿nd
determinants of OHS standards by letting unions set OHS standards. This monopoly view of
OHS-setting unions and employment-setting ￿rms is - as in wage-setting models of unions - a
short-cut to a more complete setup with endogenous union membership where workers form
groups to increase the speed of learning.
Some of our ￿ndings are as follows: Each ￿rm individually is opposed to higher OHS stan-
dards as they reduce TFP and thereby pro￿ts. Unlike compensating di⁄erentials setups with
complete information, competitive markets here are unable to take health e⁄ects of technolo-
gies into account: individuals can not judge with su¢ ciently high precision to what extent a
certain job a⁄ects health. The laissez-faire factor allocation is characterized by ine¢ ciently
high sickness leaves. If better-informed ￿rm-level trade unions set OHS standards, the posi-
tive e⁄ect on more health of their members balances the negative e⁄ect of lower employment
due to lower TFP. If there are economy-wide or occupational unions, OHS standards are more
comprehensive as unions also take the negative health e⁄ect on overall labour supply into ac-
count. If unions are not too extreme in their health preferences, higher OHS standards than
those favoured by ￿rms increase economy-wide output and increase welfare. The presence of
unions is welfare-increasing.
Capital owners favour higher OHS standards than individual ￿rms.4 Capital owners see
that an economy-wide increase in health increases labour supply and thereby returns to cap-
ital owners - as long as the positive health e⁄ect is not overcompensated by the negative
TFP e⁄ect. Capital owners might even favour higher OHS standards than ￿rm-level unions.
Capital owners could never, however, be at the origin of improving work standards as they
simply do not feel (in the literal sense of the word) health e⁄ects. They have no incentive
to form ￿capitalists movements￿as bad working conditions do not a⁄ect them. When we
compare capital owners to economy-wide unions, unions desire higher OHS standards as they
value health per se (capital does not become sick but workers do). Hence, both at the ￿rm
level and at the economy-wide level there is con￿ ict of interest between unions on the one
hand and ￿rms and capital owners, respectively, on the other. But for some range of OHS,
4Capital owners here and in what follows denote a federation which represents the joint interest of capital
owners in an economy. Individuals looking only at capital income in one speci￿c ￿rm would never agree on
higher OHS standards.
4unions and capital owners agree on increasing OHS standards. This explains why - after
some initial historical dispute and controversies over OHS standards - most OHS standards
in OECD countries are no longer hotly disputed today.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. First, there is an obviously huge
literature on trade unions, and it would be impossible to provide a summary here which does
any justice to the various substrands. While it seems fair to argue that most contributions
attribute a distorting (e¢ ciency-reducing) role to unions5, there are also quite some econo-
mists that ￿nd positive aspects in union behaviour: Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1) see
unions as the precursor of the modern welfare state. They write on p. 163 that ￿unions devel-
oped mutual insurance as part of associational self-help to compensate for the lack of private
insurance or public social protection. At the same time, they mobilized [...] for the expansion
of social rights. Increasingly, many of the protective functions that unions provided [...] came
to be taken over by the state￿ .6 A by now well-accepted argument was made by Freeman and
Medo⁄ (1984): By providing a ￿collective voice￿ , unions provide information which other-
wise would not be available. Malcomson (1983) argues that unions increase e¢ ciency as they
improve the allocation of risk-bearing between ￿rms and workers. Acemoglu et al. (2001)
argue that unions induce training and provide insurance and Boeri and Burda (2009) show
that workers prefer collective bargaining in the presence of market imperfections. Booth and
Chatterji (1998) and Viscusi (1979, ch. 11) show how trade union bargaining with monop-
sonistic ￿rms increases social welfare and Agell (1999, p. F144), more generally, argues that
￿certain institutions may serve quite useful purposes￿in the labour market. We provide OHS
standards as an example of such a useful institution. We believe that this bene￿cial historical
aspect of worker movements for nowadays modern societies and the role unions can play in
developing countries today has not received su¢ cient credit so far. Our contribution lies in
the emphasis and analysis, in the framework of a very simple model, of the informational and
learning advantage of a union in a world with incomplete information and side-e⁄ects of new
technologies.
Second, and maybe most importantly, our view of multi-feature workplaces is related to
but di⁄ers starkly from the equalizing di⁄erences approach of Rosen (1974, 1986). Equalizing
di⁄erences are traditionally derived in setups with perfect information. When workers know
5Distortions can have their positive sides in second best worlds or when it comes to collecting rents. See
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) for an example with an employment-oriented union in an international trade
setup with imperfect competition.
6Historical evidence linking union growth to their provision of insurance (strikes, unemployment, sickness,
burial cost) for the Netherlands and Britain is provided by van Leeuwen (1997). Quantitative evidence for
the United States for union decline due to an expanding welfare state is provided by Neumann and Rissman
(1984).
5about all job characteristics and all markets are competitive, factor allocation is e¢ cient and
any institution would be distorting. Given the historical situation and technological examples
we have in mind, perfect information on the side of workers does not appear to be a realistic
assumption. We therefore choose the other extreme and assume that workers are unable to
learn anything about work-related health implications. While reality certainly lies inbetween,
the justi￿cation for our assumption is simple: When new technologies become available,
workers and often society as a whole do not know a lot about potential side-e⁄ects. Health
implications can be very long-term and workers might simply not have the time to learn about
these implications. Hence, abstracting from learning processes which take a very long time,
we assume right away that learning by individual workers is impossible. As a consequence, a
decentralized factor allocation is ine¢ cient. Trade unions, by contrast, consisting of a large
number of workers, have access to many observations about jobs, can collect this information
and can therefore learn more easily. In fact, we assume that unions have perfect information
and can therefore internalize externalities, increase e¢ ciency, output and welfare.
Finally, the rapidly growing literature on child labour touches upon some aspects covered
also here. For example, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) analyse how attitudes towards child
labour regulation can change over time. Baland and Robinson (2000) derive determinants
of child labour and generally ￿nd that child labour is ine¢ cient. In contrast, Krueger and
Donohue (2005) ￿nd that a child-labour ban is not necessarily welfare increasing. To the ex-
tent that child labour is bad for health and safety of children, our analysis implicitly studies
the e⁄ects of trade unions on child labour. In fact, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005, p. 1494)
mention that the ￿trade union movement played a key role in lobbying for the introduction
of child labour regulation￿ . Baland and Robinson (2000, footnote 17) make a similar point.
This literature, however, does not focus on unions as an institution as we do here and does
not attempt to work out the potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects unions and their use of their market
power can have. A companion paper (Donado and W￿lde, 2010) qualitatively and quantita-
tively studies the e⁄ect of globalization for labour standards in the North and in the South
in the presence of unions as portrayed here.
3 The model
Our economy produces a homogenous good. Aggregate output amounts to Y . A typical ￿rm
produces the quantity y by employing capital k and labour l, the latter of which is measured
in working hours. All ￿rms use the same technology with TFP A(s);
y = A(s)f (k;l); (1)
where capital and labour inputs have the usual neoclassical e⁄ects on output. Given our
historical perspective on what are now OECD countries or our focus on developing countries
6today, we assume that ￿rms can hire from a spot market. There are no hiring or ￿ring costs
and it does not take any time to ￿nd a worker.
The central focus of this paper is OHS. This aspect is re￿ ected in the production process in
the TFP component A(s). TFP in a ￿rm or in a country is in￿ uenced by many factors starting
from very technology-speci￿c aspects (like the age distribution of the capital stock or the
management and communication skills of sta⁄) and going to more economy-wide in￿ uences
(like the institutional stability, the political regime, or the education level of workers). The
more important factor in￿ uencing TFP for our arguments is OHS s. A job is safe(r) if a
worker is (more) certain to return home in good health after 8 (or more) hours of work. We
capture safer jobs by a higher s > 0:
Safe workplaces are clearly in the interest of the worker, and in many cases, OHS is also
a central concern for employers. If safety measures increase the smoothness of a production
process, employers should be in favour of high safety standards. An accident in a coal mine
costing not only lifes of workers but also letting the production process break down for weeks
is clearly not in the interest of the ￿rm. In many cases, however, there is a fundamental
con￿ ict of interest. In the case of low-skill workers or workers needing only general (i.e.
not ￿rm-speci￿c) human capital to perform their job and in countries where ￿rms do not
(have to) pay sickness-leave (i.e. whenever ￿rms can easily replace their workers), ￿rms have
no economic interest in the state of health of their workers. Quite to the contrary, OHS
measures are costly. A workplace where coal miners are well protected against the black lung
disease or ore miners against silicosis is more costly than one without protection measures like
ventilation systems. A worker who spends half an hour on dressing and undressing (helmets,
safety glasses, gloves, entire suits etc.) is less productive than a worker who starts doing his
job right away.
What matters for our results is that workers value safety more than ￿rms. For modelling
purposes, we go to the extreme and exclude ￿rms from any bene￿ts from higher safety. We
capture safety costs by letting OHS measures reduce TFP, As < 0.7 Given the spot market
assumption, a sick worker would simply be replaced by a new healthy worker.
An individual values consumption c and health z and both are determined by the job an
individual chooses. A job is therefore a di⁄erentiated good as in Rosen (1974). Let z (s;m)
denote the share of potential working hours that an individual is healthy and can work. Currie
and Madrian (1999) summarize the literature on health and labour markets. They document
a positive relationship between health and income with larger e⁄ects of health on hours than
on wages. While it is true that the link between health and labour market participation is less
clear-cut (Currie and Madrian stress that this could be due to an abundance of methodological
problems), we feel safe to assume in what follows that longer working hours m under bad OHS
7This is the standard assumption in the literature on compensating di⁄erentials, see e.g. Rosen (1986). If
A increased in s; no uncertain jobs would ever be observed. One can always imagine that A initially increases
in s but decreases above some threshold level. It could be that low s reduces labour productivity rather than
TFP. For simplicity, we will continue to use the term TFP.
7standards are bad for health, zm < 0; but safety measures s improve health, zs > 0 (subscripts
denote partial derivatives). Utility of workers increases in consumption c and health z (s;m)
but with a decreasing slope, uc > 0, ucc < 0 and uz > 0, uzz < 0. Letting all individuals work
the same number of hours m, we can suppress m and use
u = u(c;z (s)) (2)
as utility function. Health is important for two reasons: It matters per se and consumption
rises due to longer hours worked. All workers are identical in their preferences.
On the aggregate level, consumption equals output C = Y and labour demand L equals
labour supply,
L = z (s)N: (3)
The latter is given by potential employment N (also measured in hours and assumed to be
￿x) times the share z (s) of time workers are healthy and can actually work. More safety,
implying more health, implies higher labour supply.
We ￿nally turn to trade unions. Depending on the degree of centralization of the nego-
tiations and wage setting, the literature usually classi￿es countries in three groups (see e.g.
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988): (1) highly decentralized systems with wage setting at the ￿rm
level (i.e. USA and Canada), (2) intermediate degree of centralization (most continental Eu-
ropean countries), and (3) highly centralized systems with wage setting at the national level
(i.e. Nordic countries and Austria). We will also consider di⁄erent degrees of centralization
and model the two polar cases of highly decentralized and a highly centralized systems.
In a decentralized setup, unions operate at the ￿rm level and are therefore small relative
to the economy as a whole. As we view spot markets as the best description of labour
markets for activities as described in the introduction, there is no attachment of workers to
the ￿rm. Hence, membership of ￿rm-level unions is just as volatile as employment at the
￿rm. As a consequence, the union only cares about the overall well-being of the l workers in
this particular ￿rm. As households value consumption and health, we let unions value these
quantities as well. Consumption depends on capital and labour income and union members
might also have some capital income. Observing union activities, however, we ￿nd it more
appropriate to model unions as institutions which focus on labour income or the employment
situation in general. Unions neglect the capital market position of their members and focus
on the wage sum of their members. Given historical examples about union behaviour in now
OECD countries and preferences of households in (2), unions also care about a worker￿ s health
and a union￿ s utility function reads
v = v (wl;z (s)); vwl > 0; vz > 0: (4)
Labour income wl of union members depends on the market wage w and on labour demand l
as chosen by the ￿rm. Depending on the importance attached to each of these two objectives,
8the union might be called income-oriented or health-oriented.8
In some countries, unions are large or form a confederation. Their basic objectives are the
same but they now represent not only the workers of a particular ￿rm but the whole labour
force,
V = V (wL;z (s)); VwL > 0; Vz > 0: (5)
The main di⁄erence to the ￿rm-level union is that health now has two positive channels,
as in individual preferences (2): health matters per se and through higher labour supply
visible here through L. An alternative idea to economy-wide unions, also captured by (5),
are occupation-speci￿c unions. As long as a union takes the e⁄ect of standards on all workers
into account (e.g. because a union represents all coal miners and not just those currently
employed in one particular ￿rm), bene￿cial labour supply e⁄ects through higher standards
are internalized by the union.
4 Centralized and decentralized OHS setting
This section explores the behaviour of a planner and OHS levels in a decentralized economy.
This allows us to understand the basic mechanism why trade unions in principle can have
positive welfare and output e⁄ects.
4.1 The planner
As all ￿rms use the same technologies, we can simply insert aggregate capital endowment K
into (1). After having inserted also the labour-market equilibrium condition (3), total output
is given by
Y (s) = A(s)f (K;z (s)N): (6)
Welfare comparisons require a social welfare function. With identical preferences and ho-
mogenous ￿rms, all workers will be equally healthy. The only source of heterogeneity of
households could be wealth holdings. As our static framework is agnostic about wealth dis-
tributions, however, we will work with the assumption of a representative consumer. We
can therefore use the individual utility function (2) and obtain a social welfare function by
inserting aggregate consumption,
U (s) = U (C (s);z (s)) = U (Y (s);z (s)): (7)
8For an introduction to the discussion on the appropriate speci￿cation of union preferences, see Oswald
(1982) and Booth (1995, ch. 4). Note that even for modern Britain, there is evidence that physical working
conditions is one important issue over which trade unions and management bargain (Millward et al., 1992,
pp. 249-254).
9A social planner maximizing social welfare (7) chooses a safety level sU that satis￿es (see
app. A.1)
"UY"Y A"As = ["UY"Y L + "Uz]"zs; (8)
where for readability all elasticities throughout this paper are de￿ned as positive quantities.
Hence, the OHS elasticity of TFP and the inverse wage elasticity of labour demand require a











for ad = 2 fAs; wLg: (9)
Condition (8) balances welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing e⁄ects of more safety. The
left-hand side captures the cost of more safety caused by a lower TFP: A one-percentage in-
crease in the safety level reduces the TFP and thereby output by "Y A"As percent. Multiplying
this with the output elasticity of welfare, "UY, yields the percentage reduction in welfare. For
maximum welfare, this negative e⁄ect of more safety has to be equal to the positive e⁄ect on
the right-hand side. A one-percentage increase in safety increases the share of time working
by "zs percent. This gives, multiplied by "Uz and by "UY"Y L respectively, the percentage
increase in utility due to better health and due to higher income.
If the planner focused only on output maximization (that is, if "Uz = 0), the optimality
condition giving the output-maximizing safety level sY would read
"Y A"As = "Y L"zs: (10)
This condition balances the output-decreasing e⁄ect on the left-hand side with the output-
increasing e⁄ect on the right-hand side. Interestingly, one can prove that for the general
production function in (6) the welfare-maximizing safety level is always higher than the
output-maximizing safety level, sU > sY.9
4.2 The decentralized economy
The standard view to a setup with multiple job characteristics is the equalizing-di⁄erences
approach of Rosen (1974, 1986). According to this approach, workers enjoy (or dislike) job
characteristics in addition to the wage and a worker￿ s utility function would look like the one
we use in (2). The di⁄erence to our approach consists in the criteria for choosing a job. In the
equalizing-di⁄erences approach, workers have full information about job characteristics and
the choice of jobs would depend both on health implications z (s) and on income leading to a
9Intuitively, the proof (see app. C.1) runs as follows: Let s maximize output in (6). Now add health to
this objective function and obtain (7). As the health term monotonously increases in s; a somewhat higher
health level is better as a marginal increases in health does not reduce output at s = sY but it does increase
the health term. Hence, sU > sY : Clearly, how much sU exceeds sY depends on how strongly health is valued,
how strongly health increases and how fast output drops when s increases.
10consumption level c: Firms can therefore choose wage-safety pairs on a worker￿ s indi⁄erence
curve. The resulting market equilibrium would be e¢ cient.
The crucial di⁄erence of our approach lies in our historical perspective of unions in nowa-
days OECD countries and the conclusions we draw about information. Workers do not have
su¢ cient information (neither would society as a whole have) to perfectly evaluate the impact
of work, a certain job or a speci￿c technology on health. Workers could form expectations but
their expectations need to be - absent perfect information - based on a prior in a Bayesian
learning sense. Perfectly competitive ￿rms taking a safety-wage trade-o⁄ into account would
then set an ine¢ cient safety level if the prior is not identical to the true distribution of the
health impact of a job. When on the job, workers would of course gradually learn about health
implications of work, but each single worker makes just a few observations, especially when
health also depends on other factors than just work and certain health impacts come with a
long delay or can not easily be observed (as the examples in the introduction have shown).
There is simply not enough variation, econometrically speaking, there are not su¢ ciently
many observations to draw ￿rm conclusions and learning can take more than a lifetime. To
capture this idea in the simplest possible way, we assume here that workers choose employ-
ment based only on the wage and ￿rms choose employment taking the wage rate as given.
This will qualitatively imply the same type of ine¢ ciency one would observe in a Bayesian
setup (as employed e.g. by Viscusi, 1979, 1980). The advantage of this shortcut is clearly the
much simpler analytical tractability.
Given this focus of workers on wages (and capital owners on returns), optimal ￿rm be-
haviour yields the familiar equality between marginal productivities and factor rewards,
w = A(s)fl (k;l); r = A(s)fk (k;l): (11)
In a laissez-faire economy, a ￿rm ￿xes, in addition to the stock of labour and capital, the
safety level s: The derivative of pro￿ts with respect to the safety level is d￿=ds = As; i.e. it
is negative. Firms only see the TFP-reducing impact of more safety. As a consequence, ￿rms
would like OHS standards to be as low as possible.10 The comparison point to the central
planner solution sU or sY is a laissez-faire safety level of s￿: Given that we exclude negative
safety levels, we can set s￿ to zero (or to the level where A(s) starts to fall, see fn. 7). The
resulting equilibrium is clearly ine¢ cient.
4.3 Capital owners
Given the assumption of a representative consumer discussed before (7), one could wonder
why there should ever be a con￿ ict of interest in this economy. We see the representative
10The same would be true for small ￿entrepreneurs￿who invest in their own ￿rm. Someone owning k in
a ￿rm and computing the safety level which maximizes rk would also ￿nd that it is optimal to reduce s as
much as possible.
11consumer assumption as a convenient shortcut which allows us to work with a social welfare
function (7) that abstracts from the distribution of wealth. We nevertheless look at two
type of institutions, trade unions and a federation of capital owners. These institutions
represent interests as if their members received only labour income or only capital income.
A more ￿realistic￿model would include a distribution of wealth and would thereby justify
endogenously con￿ icting interests. The conclusion one would draw concerning optimal safety
levels for capital and labour would be identical, as we now see.
Let us contrast the ￿rm safety level to one which would be set by a federation uniting all
capital owners in an economy. At the country level, the safety level sR that maximizes total
capital income r(s)K is described by (see app. A.5)
"rA"As = "rL"zs; (12)
where again the elasticities are de￿ned as in (9). Here, capital holders do not only consider
the TFP-reducing impact (on the left) but also the health-increasing impact (on the right) of
more safety. The reason for this is that interest rates depend on output, and, as we already
saw, output can be increased by increasing the workers￿health in a country.
The safety di⁄erences between the planner, the ￿rms and capital owners highlights the
externality caused by the production process. If the planner focused on TFP only, as does
each ￿rm, OHS s would be as low as possible since this increases output (6). A low safety
level, however, decreases the share z (s) of time a worker is healthy and can work. This
reduces aggregate labour supply z (s)N and therefore output (6). Hence, the starting point
of our analysis of the e⁄ects of union activity is a second-best world where production exerts
a negative externality on health. Output in a laissez-faire economy is ine¢ ciently low and
adding an institution - a union in our case - that sets OHS standards can improve e¢ ciency.
5 Endogenous OHS with trade unions
The previous section explored the e⁄ects of the negative production externality. We will now
show that if trade unions are introduced, the distorting e⁄ect can be reduced or even elimi-
nated. Why does the union have the knowledge and means required to do so? There are two
reasons: First, unions have many members and the more members there are, the easier it is
to learn about a job situation. Due to its size, the union can collect information more easily
than individuals. Second, in contrast to a loose group of workers having no institutional con-
nection, unions have the means to ￿prove￿the link between bad work conditions and health.
They can more easily monitor the credibility of individual claims about work conditions11
and they also have the power to impose better working conditions. Unions are a means to
11The importance of unions to alleviate moral hazard problems has already been stressed by Beveridge in
1909 (quote taken from van Leeuwen, 1997, p. 786). Beveridge claims that unions of his time were in the
best position to monitor the appropriate use of unemployment bene￿t payments.
12overcome the information and credibility problem of individual workers12 (see, for example,
Fenn and Ashby (2004), p. 46, and Robinson (1991), pp. 41-7).
We will ￿rst analyse the principles of optimal union behaviour in a general setup. We
compare the implied safety levels with those optimal for capital owners. This allows us to
see under which conditions and to which extent there is a con￿ ict of interest between unions
and capital owners. We will then look at various examples (with Cobb-Douglas (CD) and
CES production and utility functions) to reveal the precise determinants of welfare gains and
potential con￿ icting of interests. This will show the potential but also the limits of union
activity on social welfare. We will consider a decentralized system (￿rm-level unions) and a
centralized system (trade union confederation).
5.1 The general case
￿ Firm-level unions
In basically all OECD countries, today and in the past, unionised and non-unionised sec-
tors coexist. Union densities change over time and sometimes unionized ￿rms compete with
non-unionized ￿rms. Various explanations can be o⁄ered for both coexistence and varying
union densities. In a competitive setup ￿ la Rosen with heterogenous ￿rms one can imagine
that ￿rms o⁄ering the more dangerous jobs are unionised while others are not. In the theo-
retical literature on ￿deunionisation￿ , Acemoglu et al. (2001) show how biased technological
change can be the reason for both deunionisation and an increase in wage inequality. In their
setup, workers have an explicit choice whether to unionize or not.
We abstract from these important issues as we want to contrast our approach to the
canonical model of trade unions. In the traditional monopoly union model (see Dunlop,
1944, Oswald, 1982), unions set the wage, ￿rms choose employment and unemployment is
the ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome. We give unions market power as well, assuming that
it is bene￿cial for workers to join a union and that unions succeed in learning better than
workers about the work-health link and in solving the monitoring problem.13 This is our
extreme short-cut to describing historical processes. Historically, worker movements do not
have any market power when they start. Political parties are often the vehicle through which
public attention and support increase. If new regulations then improve OHS standards, they
are put into force by the government. Indirectly, however, these new regulations are set by
12Firms can also learn faster than individual workers as a ￿rm hires many workers. Once the ￿rm has
learned about negative health e⁄ects of a certain technology, however, it might not be in the ￿rm￿ s interest
to reveal its information as workers with health problems incurred in the past could then ￿le claims.
13Giving unions market power allows us to use the elegant monopoly union setup. This should not suggest,
however, that we make a second best world argument where one distortion (the market power of unions)
corrects for another distortion (imperfect knowledge). Unions are bene￿cial even without (or despite) market
power as they provide a superior (collective) learning technology as compared to individualistic learning.
Future work could use a Bayesian learning setup where collective information collection alone improves welfare.
13worker movements and this is what we capture here. Unions use their market power not to
set wages - as in the traditional model - but to set the safety level s. While unions in the
real world are concerned with several issues of which wage negotiation is an important one,
we focus here entirely on union activities related to improving work conditions as described
in the introduction. Wages are perfectly ￿ exible in our setup and there is no unemployment.
At the ￿rm level, employment l in the union￿ s objective function (4) is given by the ￿rm￿ s
labour demand from (11) which through TFP is a function of the safety level, l = l(A(s)).
The wage rate w and the ￿rm￿ s capital stock k in the labour demand function l(￿) are taken as
parametric by the union. The choice of the safety level sv is perceived by the union to a⁄ect
labour demand through TFP and health z (s). Assuming an interior solution, the ￿rst-order
condition of maximizing (4) subject to l = l(A(s)) is given with (9) by (see app. A.3)
"vwl"lA"As = "vz"zs: (13)
As in the planner￿ s trade-o⁄, safety here also has a positive and a negative e⁄ect. The
negative e⁄ect on the left-hand side comes through the reduction in labour demand by the
￿rm as a result of the cost associated with a higher safety: A one-percentage increase of
safety decreases TFP by "As percent and the labour demand by "lA"As percent. Multiplying
this with "vwl gives the percentage reduction in utility. The positive e⁄ect on the right-hand
side is the direct e⁄ect of more health on utility: A one-percentage increase in the safety level
increases health by "zs percent which multiplied by "vz gives the percentage increase in utility.
The di⁄erences between the union￿ s optimal sv from (13) and the planner￿ s sU from (8)
stem from three sources: First, the union might value health di⁄erently than the central
planner, i.e. v (￿) might di⁄er from U (￿). In fact, the union might value health more (i.e. "vz
might be greater than "Uz) since all workers are a⁄ected by workplace conditions while not all
consumers are, as some consumers might live on capital income only. Second, the union cares
about labour income wl only and not about total consumption C. In other words, capital
income of capital owners is not taken into account. Third, maybe most surprisingly, ￿rm-level
unions without ￿xed membership do not take into account the positive e⁄ect of an increased
health on the labour supply and thereby on output, the "UY"Y L"zs term in (8).
￿ The trade union confederation
The union confederation has the same objectives as the ￿rm-level union even though it
represents not only the workers from a particular ￿rm but the whole labour force. Con-
sequently, employment in the union confederation￿ s objective function (5) is economy-wide
labour supply L = z
￿
sV￿











: The safety level set by the confederation is denoted by sV. The
optimality condition is (see app. A.4), using again (9),
"V wL"wA"As = ["V wL [1 ￿ "wL] + "V z]"zs; (14)
14The optimality condition (14) again balances the positive and negative e⁄ects of a higher safety
level. In contrast to the ￿rm-level union, however, the union confederation does take into
account the positive e⁄ect of an increased health on the labour supply, the "V wL [1 ￿ "wL]"zs
term. In fact, condition (14) has more in common with the welfare-maximizing condition in
(8) than with (13). Comparing (8) and (14) makes clear that health per se has a similar
impact on both conditions, the terms "Uz"zs and "V z"zs. However, the main di⁄erence resides
in the fact that the union confederation is only interested in the workers￿income, wL, while
the central planner considers the whole income, that is, the income of workers and of capital
holders: Y = wL + rK.
5.2 An example
While intuitive, the ￿rst-order conditions of the planner, the unions or capital owners might
not be satis￿ed. The positive e⁄ect of more health could always be stronger than the negative
e⁄ect of a lower TFP - or vice versa. The conditions also reveal little about the central
determinants of health and safety levels. We therefore now look at a speci￿c example in
which a unique optimum can be easily identi￿ed and the con￿ ict of interest in our economy
can be studied.
￿ Functional forms
Assume a CES form for utility functions with arguments income and health. The house-
hold utility function in (2) and the ￿rm-level union￿ s objective function in (4) are thus assumed















where 0 < ￿;￿ < 1 and ￿ < 1. The confederation￿ s utility in (5) and our example for the















Let there be a CD production function at the ￿rm level and therefore also on aggregate with







15Health is captured in all utility functions by z (s) with a weight of ￿ for the households
and the central planner and a corresponding weight ￿ for unions. Unions might value health
di⁄erently than ￿normal￿households as all union members are subject to health e⁄ects of
working while households also include capital owners which are not exposed to health hazards.
Likewise, income at the household or planner level is all income and can therefore be expressed
by individual consumption c or aggregate output Y: Income taken into account by unions is
labour income only, i.e. wl or wL: In all cases, the elasticity of substitution between income
and health is given by 1=(1 ￿ ￿). For ￿ ! 0, the CES functions (15) to (18) become CD
functions, e.g. u = c￿z (s)
1￿￿ and v = [wl]
￿ z (s)
1￿￿ for (15) and (16).
Finally, let us choose functional forms for TFP and the share of time being healthy as
related to OHS which have the properties discussed after (1) and (3),
A(s) = be
￿￿s; z (s) = 1 ￿ ￿ qe
￿￿s; (21)
where b, ￿ and ￿ are positive constants. When s is very low, TFP is close to its maximum
b and the share of healthy hours is close to its minimum 1 ￿ ￿ q. Restricting ￿ q to take values
between zero and one, zero safety measures still imply that workers are on average healthy
during 1 ￿ ￿ q percent of the time. The higher s is, the closer TFP is to zero and the higher
the average health z (s) is.
￿ Optimal safety levels
The existence of optimal safety levels follows from computing ￿rst-order conditions and
checking the sign of the ￿rst derivative to the left and right of the optimum in general equi-
librium. A general equilibrium perspective has been taken for the maximization procedure
by economy-wide institutions (the planner and the nation-wide union). Firm-level unions
compute their optimal safety level given the ￿rm￿ s labour demand function. We take these
optimality conditions and replace ￿rm variables (like the capital stock k) by aggregate vari-
ables adopting the standard symmetric equilibrium view with many identical unions.
Table 1 presents ￿rst-order conditions for CES utility functions (15) to (18) and corre-
sponding CD results for ￿ ! 0, i.e. the safety levels for the welfare-maximizing and the
output-maximizing planner and for both types of unions (see app. B.4).
The safety level sY in (b) chosen by a planner who maximizes output only (i.e. ￿ = 1 in
(18)) is positive if the term in squared brackets is larger than one, (1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=￿) ￿ q > 1:
Given that ￿ q is the share of time sick, this expression is larger than one only for a su¢ ciently
small ￿ or ￿ or a large ￿: A small ￿ implies a high output elasticity of labour. A planner
will therefore provide more safety when this has a stronger positive e⁄ect on output. When
￿ is small, the cost of safety on TFP by (21) is not so strong and a planner will also provide
more safety. Similarly with ￿ : More safety, again by (21), increases health and labour supply
strongly and the planner is induced to provide more safety. Let us assume that parameters










































































Table 1 Optimal occupational health and safety levels for (19) to (21)
When looking at the signs of the ￿rst and second derivatives, one ￿nds that sY is an
optimum indeed and one obtains an ￿inverted U￿shape for Y (s) from (20) as illustrated in
￿g. 1. To the right of sY; the positive e⁄ect of an increase in the safety level on health and





sY=sR sU sV sv sp
Figure 1 Output and welfare as a function of occupational health and safety s
17The other expressions in table 1 are implicit for the CES utility functions, as the elasticities
"(￿) are functions of the safety levels. We will return to these forms further below. For the
CD case, we also obtain straightforward solutions which can be given similar interpretations
as for the output-maximizing safety level. The additional factor in (a), (c) and (d) are the
preference parameters ￿ and ￿: When health is valued strongly, i.e. ￿ and ￿ are low, the
welfare, ￿rm-level union or confederation safety levels, as expected, go up. Again, looking
at the signs of the CD ￿rst and second derivatives shows that the optimal safety levels are
maxima indeed.
￿ Con￿ ict of interests?
Who wants what in our economy? Given the richness of channels visible in the CD-results
of table 1, we make a weak assumption concerning parameters which allows us to focus on the
most realistic con￿ icts of interest: ￿ < ￿ < ￿. The output elasticity of capital, ￿; is around
1=3: When comparing this to ￿; the value attached by unions to labour income in (16) and
(17), our assumption says that unions, even though they are health oriented, the weight they
attach to labour income is at least 1=3: The second part of the assumption says that union
values health more than society as a whole, ￿ < ￿: This also appears plausible as members
of unions are all subject to health risks while society also consists of capital owners who are
not.
The planner, the unions and the capital owners potentially all desire di⁄erent safety lev-
els. The planner can appear either in its welfare or in its output-maximizing guise, unions
and capital owners are both represented at the ￿rm and the nation-wide level. With our








The output-maximizing planner and the capital owners agree on the safety level, sR = sY:
What maximizes output maximizes capital income rK, clearly a property of the CD structure
of output in (20). The welfare-maximizing planner wants a higher safety level than the output
planner, sY < sU; see fn. 9.
Nation-wide unions desire a higher OHS level than the welfare planner due to ￿ < ￿.
If society and nation-wide unions had identical preferences (￿ = ￿), unions could replace
the central planner. They would internalize the production externality and would set the
welfare-maximizing safety level.
When looking at capital and labour representatives at the ￿rm level, we know already
from the discussion after (11) that ￿rms want the lowest possible safety level s￿. Concerning
unions, we ￿nd a surprising result: Firm-level unions want a lower safety level sv than capital
owners or a central planner who is purely interested in output maximization. The reason is
that the central planner (and the capital owners) know about (and internalize) the bene￿ts
of more health for labour supply. The ￿rm-level union sees positive e⁄ects from higher OHS
18standards only in its pure health e⁄ect and neglects labour supply e⁄ects (in fact, it looks at
labour l in its objective function as the labour demand by ￿rms which falls as TFP falls as a
result of higher safety).14
Summarizing, the nation-wide union, given its ￿exaggerated￿ emphasis on health is in
con￿ ict with society as a whole which in turn wants higher OHS standards than output-
maximizers and capital owners. The lowest safety providers are ￿rm-owners and ￿rm-level
unions.15 Comparing union output and welfare with a laissez-faire economy is straightforward
when using ￿g. 1. Unions are welfare or output increasing if the safety level they set is to the
left of sY and sU, respectively. If they ￿overdo things￿ , i.e. if the union safety level is too far
to the right of sY or sU; they would still be bene￿cial to the economy if the negative e⁄ect on
TFP is not too strong, i.e. if the decrease of output and welfare to the right of their maxima
is modest. For illustration purposes, the ranking in (22) is also plotted in ￿g. 1.
5.3 OHS and development
Empirical analyses suggest a negative correlation between the development level of a country
and the risk of injury while working (Hall and Leeson, 2007, Flanagan, 2006, pp. 44-7). Should
this give rise to policy concerns or is this a feature of an e¢ cient development process?
Using the implicit-function theorem on CES safety levels as presented in table 1 shows
that the reaction depends on the elasticity of substitution between income (wili for the ￿rm-

























Both the planner and the two types of unions would set a higher safety level if the elasticity
of substitution between health and income is low. This can be understood by recurring to the
income and substitution e⁄ect. There is an income e⁄ect due to more capital which increases
demand for health z (si) and consumption, the two arguments in the planner￿ s utility function
in (7). The price of health relative to consumption, however, rises the more capital there is
and households tend to substitute health by income.
In the CD case these e⁄ects cancel. Safety levels do not change in the course of development
of a country. This would be the ￿universal work standard￿ case advocated by some who
postulate that all countries in the world, irrespective of their level of development, should
have the same OHS standards. When substitution is easy, it is not clear which e⁄ect is
14Departing from our parameter assumption would imply that a ￿rm-level union sets a higher safety level
than a central output-planner if it only values health enough. App. C.2 shows that sv Q sY , ￿ Q ￿:
15Again, departing from our assumption on parameters, one can show that for ￿ = ￿￿ the ￿rm-level union
would set the same safety level as a planner sv = sU (see app. C.2).
19stronger. In this case, health standards could even go down when a country becomes richer.
The substitution e⁄ect would dominate the income e⁄ect.
The case that seems to be empirically more relevant is the one in which work standards
are higher, the higher the development level of a country is (Hall and Leeson, 2007, Flanagan,
2006, pp. 44-7). This is the bad substitution case (￿ < 0) in our model. When a society
becomes richer, it can a⁄ord more health and as income is a bad substitute for health, OHS
standards go up accepting that this reduces TFP and therefore dampens the increase in
income. Our view that the positive link between development and OHS standards is also due
to unions is also shared by Kahn (1990, p.481) who writes that ￿union workers implicitly
trade o⁄ wage and bene￿ts growth for occupational safety improvements￿ .
Note that this empirical ￿nding also points to the fact that real-world economies generally
do not have a laissez-faire safety level of s￿ as introduced after (11). In a laissez-faire economy,
more capital does not imply better OHS standards. Only if unions (or a benevolent central
planner or related institutions) are present, the safety level can increase in the course of
economic development.
6 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the belief that an institution like trade unions which has
been around for more than a century and is active in almost all countries in the world can not
only be detrimental to economic production and welfare of a society. Studying activities of
workers￿associations and trade unions beyond wage negotiation has shown that trade unions
play a major role in providing workplace safety - at least in providing information about the
necessity of measures that assure occupational health and safety (OHS). Trade unions did
perform this role historically in nowadays OECD countries and do play such a role today in
certain industrializing economies.
Can these OHS activities of unions assign unions an output and welfare increasing role?
Our analysis has shown that output and welfare e⁄ects of unions depend on union objectives
and, more importantly, on the degree of centralization in an economy. Firm-level unions set
lower OHS standards than economy-wide unions as the former neglect the positive labour
supply e⁄ect of higher OHS. Firm-level unions are just as short-sighted (i.e. focused on this
one ￿rm) as ￿rms and treat employment as the outcome of labour demand decisions by the
￿rm. They provide OHS only as they value health of their members per se. Economy-wide
unions fully internalize the positive labour supply e⁄ect due to more OHS and therefore set
higher safety standards. In fact, ruling out distributional e⁄ects from variations in the size
of the labour force (i.e. assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology), economy-wide unions which
attach the same importance to health as society as a whole set the social welfare-maximizing
OHS standards. Even with a ￿rm-level union, output and welfare increases compared to a
laissez-faire economy.
20Can other institutions play a similar role as unions do? We have seen that capital owners -
as opposed to individual atomistic ￿rms - would also internalize economy-wide labour supply
e⁄ects and value health of workers. Capital owners trying to maximize their revenue would
increase overall output and welfare of an economy as compared to a laissez-faire economy
but never up to the social welfare-maximizing point. The incentives for capital owners to
form a coalition and internalize the negative health externality, however, are much lower than
for workers. Capital owners ￿do not feel health hazards￿ . It is only the workers who are
directly confronted with risk at work. Hence, workers￿associations are the most probable
institution to initially play this output and welfare increasing role. After some time, when
general awareness in society about OHS standards or particular health issues has grown, the
role of trade unions can be taken over by society as a whole, i.e. by some voting process
through a government. This might be the reason why in the US, UK, Germany and many
other OECD countries, governmental agencies nowadays take care of OHS standards and
provide various types of work and health related insurances - and partly make them even
compulsory.
The paper has various shortcomings which can be overcome in future work. Can unions
play a welfare-increasing role in industrialized countries today where OHS standards are set
by government agencies? One would have to start with an analysis where some ￿rms or sectors
in the North are unionized while others are not. A partial unionisation setup would also be
useful to understand the e⁄ects of unions in the South better. Any increasing role would
come gradually and unions would not become monopoly unions instantaneously. Second, the
assumption of ignorance on the side of workers and perfect information of unions can be
replaced by a Bayesian learning approach. One can expect that the relative degree of risk-
aversion of workers (with respect to labour income relative to health e⁄ects) will determine
whether ￿optimistic￿ workers (their prior predicts a higher expected share of time being
healthy than a certain job actually implies) accept higher or lower wages than the perfect
information compensating di⁄erential wage. One can then also analyse precisely the incentives
for workers to join a union (thereby also capturing the fact that no real-world economy is
100% unionized) and understand how joint learning increases welfare. Third, what happens
if unions are allowed to set or bargain wages? Is the traditional labour rationing distortion
always overcompensated by the positive safety setting as portrayed here? All these extensions
would allow to understand better to what extent joint action and cooperative behaviour - as
opposed to an individualistic view of society - is important for forming modern humane
societies.
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